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Introduction 
 In November 1965, the government of Southern Rhodesia unilaterally declared itself 
independent from Britain. It was an extreme response to the British directive that there would be 
“no independence before majority rule.” The ruling political party during this time, the 
Rhodesian Front, feared the consequences of relinquishing power. Born out of imperialist beliefs 
and anti-communist sentiment, this ultra-conservative political party sought to maintain minority 
rule and asserted that Rhodesia would “never in a thousand years” be ruled by the Black 
majority. While many Whites supported minority rule, my paper will focus on the efforts of 
select groups within the White African community to subvert the Rhodesian Front led 
government and initiate majority rule within what would become the state of Zimbabwe. I am 
looking specifically at two groups of people who have different philosophies, yet share the same 
goal of majority rule. This paper will discuss notable members from each group including Judith 
Todd, an equal rights activist and daughter of a former Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, and 
Bishop Donal Lamont, an Irish missionary who defied an emergency governmental order and 
assisted the Black resistance. 
 
Background 
 The British colony of Rhodesia was founded in 1889 due in major part to one man, Cecil 
John Rhodes1. An Oxford graduate, Rhodes had come to South Africa in the mid-19th century to 
improve his health. It was there that he first made his fortune in diamond mining—becoming a 
millionaire by his mid-twenties. He then invested in the gold mines of South Africa—making 
himself a multi-millionaire by the time he was thirty.2 Without the need to increase his income, 
                                                 
1 S. Hopewell, From Colonies to Commonwealth (London: Cassell & Company, 1967), 126–127. 
2 Brian Lapping, End of Empire (London: Granada Publishing, 1985), 447. 
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Rhodes set about achieving his political aspirations. Heavily influenced by the rhetoric of the 
time and most especially by John Ruskin, Rhodes endeavored to “[seize] every piece of fruitful 
waste ground…and advance the power of England.”3 He did this by attempting to fulfill the 
vision of a British empire in Africa that stretched from “Cape to Cairo”, or South Africa to 
Egypt, encompassing an entire portion of the north to south expanse of the continent.4 This goal 
would increase not only Rhodes’ wealth and influence, but England’s as well. It was during the 
‘scramble for Africa’ that Rhodes was able to achieve this goal.  
In the 1880’s, European countries began to “scramble” for control of colonies in Africa. 
Each country drew the borders of their new colonies in Europe and then sent agents to the 
ground to seek ‘concessions’ or treaties from native peoples in those areas. These concessions 
served as agreements by native peoples to European involvement in those areas, no matter how 
dubious the terms or untrustworthy the interpreter. Rhodes was not the one traveling into remote 
areas and gaining the trust of tribal chiefs. Instead he bought small concessions from many 
people and combined them together into one claim. The first place Rhodes attempted to do this 
was in the land he called Zambesia, for the river that flowed to its north. Later known as 
Rhodesia and now finally, as Zimbabwe. Rhodes obtained the Rudd Concession, named for the 
British agent Charles Dunnell Rudd, by deceiving the Matabele king Lobengula. Rhodes 
promised rifles, ammunition, a monthly salary, and most fantastically, an armed steamboat on 
the Zambezi River to Lobengula if he signed the treaty. Exactly what he agreed to is unclear. It is 
certain that Lobengula conceded mining rights, but one of the stipulations may have been that 
                                                 
3 Quoted in Robert Blake, A History of Rhodesia (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1977), 35. 
4 Lapping, End of Empire, 448. 
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Rhodes would not allow more than ten white men into his country—a promise Rhodes had as 
much intention of keeping as he did of giving Lobengula a steamboat.5 
Once Rhodes had his concession, he needed to buy all other competing concessions and 
persuade the colonial authorities in London to authorize the charter. It took more than a year, but 
in October 1889, Queen Victoria signed a royal charter assigning Rhodes’ British South Africa 
Company the governance of the new colony. The charter would mean the British South Africa 
Company would hold a monopoly on all mining rights in the new colony. It also gave the 
company authority to govern, build roads, allocate land to settlers, and police the population.6 In 
essence, the British South Africa Company was able to act as a small government within the 
British colonial system, not unlike others chartered companies in the British Empire. Once 
Rhodes received the charter, he began to actively recruit investors and white settlers for his new 
colony. Contrary to the agreement made with Lobengula, Rhodes had the full intention of 
making the new colony, then termed Zambesia, a settler state. At the same time, he was also 
attempting to expand the territory he owned by buying land concession from chiefs in the area 
that would eventually become Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Although these areas were also 
obtained by Rhodes, neither Northern Rhodesia nor Nyasaland ever came under the control of 
the British South Africa Company in the same manner Southern Rhodesia had.7 Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland became areas of colonial exploitation rather than white settlement; this 
resulted in much a lower white population in these countries at the time of their independence 
than in Rhodesia. 
                                                 
5 Lapping, End of Empire, 450. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., 452. 
5 
 
Rhodes and his company worried many Europeans living in the new colony who were 
fearful of the effect that Rhodes and his company would have on native Africans.8 These fears 
were realized only a few years after the founding of the colony when the first Matabele War 
began.9 By 1893, the relationship between the settlers and the native Africans had become 
increasingly strained and was headed toward conflict.10 The Matabele leader, Lobengula, sensed 
the superiority of the European forces and hoped for a peaceful resolution to the conflict, as did 
the British government. The leaders of Rhodes’ new colony, however, had other ideas. With their 
well-armed war parties, the European settlers were able to easily overtake and defeat the 
Matabele people. The settlers divided the Matabele land among themselves and any remaining 
land was divided up into allotments for white immigrants. Natives who stayed were in effect 
trespassing on what Rhodes had by then declared “white man’s country.”11  
There is a popular exception to this colonial narrative of overwhelming European settler 
victories. In December 1893, the British South Africa security force sent a group of fifteen men 
on a reconnaissance mission to scout out the location of Lobengula’s camp which was situated 
across the Shangani River. The Major in command of the scouting patrol chose to disobey orders 
and attempted to seize Lobengula. He sent word back to camp asking for reinforcements and 
twenty-one men were sent to assist him. Unsuccessful in their attempt to capture the Matabele 
leader, all thirty-six men were killed. Evidence found at the scene later revealed the men had 
fought until their ammunition ran out. In later years, especially during the Ian Smith regime, the 
men of the Shangani Patrol became a preeminent symbol of Rhodesia. The men who sacrificed 
their lives epitomized the Rhodesian ideals of courage, heroism, and persistence. They also stood 
                                                 
8 Lapping, End of Empire, 450. 
9 Hopewell, From Colonies to Commonwealth, 128. 
10 Ian Smith The Great Betrayal: The Memoirs of Ian Douglas Smith (London: Blake Publishing, 1997), 2. 
11 Lapping End of Empire, 454. 
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as a representation of civilization in midst of savagery and the plight the white man; severely 
outnumbered—and surrounded by Africans. 
During the first decades of the twentieth century, the Charter Company became 
financially unstable. The British realized that a change needed to be made. Therefore, in 1923, 
Rhodesians were given the choice between merging with South Africa as its fifth province or 
becoming a “Responsible Government”.12 The second option was an unusual offer and 
essentially gave Rhodesia a “quasi-dominion” status. Rhodesia was still a colony, but due to 
Britain’s previous laxity and absence of oversight, the British were open to the idea of allowing 
Rhodesia more freedom than it had yet given to any of their other colonies. For Rhodesia, this 
meant that they were able to enjoy the benefits of dominion status without the burden of 
financing foreign affairs and diplomatic missions which the British government would fund.13 
When Rhodesians went to the polls, they voted for Responsible Government.  
Rhodesia had nineteen thousand registered voters in 1923 and nearly fifteen-thousand 
votes were cast in the decision for or against Responsible Government. It is interesting to note 
that at the time there were also eight-hundred and fifty thousand Africans who were not allowed 
to vote.14 In the 1923 election all British citizens were able to vote as was anyone who pledged 
allegiance to the British as long as they were over twenty-one, could fill out the application 
forms by themselves in English, owned property worth one-hundred and fifty pounds sterling, or 
had an income of one-hundred pounds sterling a year. At this time there were no racial 
restriction; the voter’s role for the 1923 Referendum included sixty Africans.15  
                                                 
12 Lapping End of Empire, 456. 
13 Smith The Great Betrayal, 3. 
14 Lapping, End of Empire, 456. 
15 John Parker, Rhodesia: Little White Island (London: Pitman Publishing, 1972), 23. 
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In his memoir, the former president of the self-liberated country of Rhodesia, Ian Smith, 
saw the election of 1923 as one of the great failings of the Rhodesian people. He believed that 
the benefits of joining South Africa would only have elevated the Rhodesian people to a greater 
economic and political degree.16 Although Rhodesian voters chose not to merge with South 
Africa, the political policies of these two countries would begin to align in the second half of the 
twentieth century. 
In the years following their achievement of Responsible Government, the white voting 
populace consistently voted for laws which substantially disenfranchised Africans and began a 
movement toward more separatist policies. The British government became increasingly 
uncomfortable with these policies as they aligned Rhodesia with South Africa and the budding 
Apartheid movement more than the British would have liked. Additionally, the idea of 
“amalgamation” kept the “spirit of Cecil Rhodes” alive. It was Rhodes’ dream to connect both 
Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland into one republic ruled by whites. This idea 
gained support in the 1930’s and 1940’s and eventually came to fruition with the founding of the 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953.17  
The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, also known as the Central African 
Federation, or simply Federation, was conceived in Britain and established in 1953 as a way for 
the British to exert more influence in Southern Africa.18 The increase of industrialization in the 
1940s gave birth to the African working class as well as African Nationalism. The same period 
also witnessed the simultaneous rise in Afrikaner apartheid-esque policies and the alignment of 
Southern Rhodesians to South African politics. The British believed that the influence of 
                                                 
16 Smith The Great Betrayal, 4. 
17 Lapping, End of Empire, 459. 
18 Ibid., 460. 
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Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland would be a mediating force between the two political 
extremes in Southern Rhodesia. Blacks from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland opposed 
Federation on the grounds that it was only beneficial to whites who gleaned political and 
economic benefit from the union. It was also feared by some Blacks that Federation would be 
used to attempt to destabilize the African Nationalist movement in Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland.19 Upon the creation of Federation, Godfrey Huggins, the Prime Minister of Southern 
Rhodesia since 1933, became the Federal Prime Minister. This led to the elevation of Garfield 
Todd as Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia. Through his years as Prime Minister, Todd would 
earn a reputation for extreme liberalism, but at the time of his promotion to Prime Minister, the 
United Party members viewed Todd as the embodiment of moderate liberal sentiment 
characteristic of their party. In his first years as Prime Minister, Todd supported the party line of 
reduced African voting enrollment. Later, as the political climate gradually changed, so did 
Todd’s agreement with his party.20 During his tenure as Prime Minister, Parliament amended the 
Land Apportionment Act to allow restaurants and hotels to become multi-racial as well as 
allowing African professionals to have their businesses in European areas. By 1956 Todd’s 
cabinet had also passed the Liquor Amendment Bill which allowed Africans to drink European 
beer and wine—though nothing harder.21 Nineteen fifty-six was also the year that the white 
electorate of Southern Rhodesia began to realize that Garfield Todd was pursuing a more liberal 
agenda than they had anticipated. As a missionary, voters already considered Todd suspect. He 
did not fit the “red-blooded Rhodesian” personality as had his predecessor, Godfrey Huggins. 
Though Todd was a rancher, his missionary work was what brought him to Rhodesia. He cared 
                                                 
19 Ruth Weiss and Jane L. Parpart. Sir Garfield Todd and the Making of Zimbabwe (London: British Academic 
Press, 1999), 67. 
20 Blake, History of Rhodesia, 287. 
21 Ibid., 290. 
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more about African education and health care than he did about his golf swing—something 
which alienated him from other White Rhodesians.22 As Todd introduced more liberal 
legislation, fear and resentment grew toward him from his White electorate—as well as from his 
cabinet.23 This mix of “personal antagonism and rejection of his policies” came to a head in 
1957.24 The Southern Rhodesian Parliament raised a motion to add an amendment to the 
Immorality Suppression Act of 1903. Originally designed to “protect” White women from the 
sexual advances of African men, the motion of 1957 sought to criminalize relations between 
White men and African women as well—making all sexual relations between races illegal. While 
miscegenation was socially taboo, the government was attempting to make it a criminal offense. 
This was, at the time, the newest law added to an existing corpus of legislation intended to 
separate Black and White Rhodesians. There was already separatism in public buildings like 
restaurants, hotels, swimming pools, schools, and hospitals. Blacks were not allowed to drink 
wine or spirits, only “Kaffir Beer” and could not move from one area to another without passes 
and certificates.25 While the motion would further separate Africans from the White population, 
many White Southern Rhodesians saw this motion as one of the utmost importance to their 
nation’s morality. Many Whites viewed miscegenation as immoral and Todd’s refusal to vote for 
the bill made him a villain who appeared to have gone out of way to defend immorality.26 As his 
reputation was crumbling, Todd’s family was not immune from the slander and ill-will directed 
toward him. Judith Todd, one of Garfield’s three daughters, recounts how at a dinner party her 
host declared how awful it must be for her to have the last name Todd because “Don’t people 
                                                 
22 Weiss and Parpart, Sir Garfield Todd, 124. 
23 Ibid., 90, 109. 
24 Ibid., 125. 
25 Blake, History of Rhodesia, 281. 
26 Weiss and Parpart, Sir Garfield Todd, 101-103. 
10 
 
automatically associate you [Judith] with that perfectly dreadful man Garfield Todd?”27 A 
continued lack of confidence in his leadership combined with his newfound vigor for the 
advancement and enfranchisement of Africans led to Todd’s political demise. Members of his 
own party resented that his liberalism “[strode] beyond the limits of the electorate’s tolerance.”28 
When he returned from holiday leave in January 1958, he was welcomed on the tarmac with 
news that his entire cabinet was calling for his resignation.29  
Following Todd’s defeat in the race for Prime Minister in the spring of 1958, he was 
succeeded by another liberal from the United Federal Party, Edgar Whitehead. A bachelor and 
recluse, the far-right regarded his elevation to Prime Minister as a “panic measure” by the United 
Federal Party in order to replace Todd in haste.30 Like Todd, he was not the “red-blooded 
Rhodesian”: an Oxford educated, partially deaf and blind Whitehead was not the representation 
of the “hearty Rhodesian” that many voters wanted to be the face of their government.31 
Nevertheless, the British High Commissioner believed that the “future [of Southern Rhodesia] 
depends on Sir Edgar Whitehead’s ability to find a rapprochement with the Africans and lead the 
country through a peaceful transition to an African majority government” this was seen 
especially difficult as the High Commissioner believed Whitehead was “faced with the immense 
problem of governing a country in which the vast majority of the population are voiceless and 
resentful.”32 Given this enormous challenge, Whitehead was not able to find rapprochement and 
Rhodesia was handed over to a party who would bring the opposite of reconciliation and 
understanding to race relations in Southern Rhodesia. 
                                                 
27 Judith Todd, An Act of Treason: Rhodesia 1965 (Harare: Longman, 1982), 47. 
28 Ian Hancock, White Liberals, Moderates and Radicals in Rhodesia (London: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), 71. 
29 Weiss, Sir Garfield Todd, 109. 
30 Smith, The Great Betrayal, 35. 
31 Hancock, White Liberals, Moderates, and Radicals, 82. 
32 The National Archives (TNA): DO 183/29 Rhodesian Front Party 
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Despite the change of Prime Minister, many Whites remained dissatisfied with the 
political leadership of the Liberal Prime Minister. The ultimate dissolution of Federation and 
therefore Federal politics led to the demise of the Dominion Party. In 1962, all three member 
countries opposed Federation and it was officially dissolved in July 1963, preceding the 
independence of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland the following year.33 While the Dominion 
Party remained intact within the countries of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, where there was 
a smaller white population and a more moderate electorate; in Southern Rhodesia former 
Dominion Party members banded together to form a new party that embraced “Rhodesian 
values” and put “Rhodesia first”.34 This new party was the Rhodesian Front.  
 
The Rhodesian Front 
The Rhodesian Front came out of obscurity in April 1962 to sweep the polls and obtain 
the two-thirds votes necessary to gain the Prime Ministership in their first election. The 
Rhodesian Front was the successor to the Federal Dominion Party and the first Prime Minister of 
the Rhodesian Front was Winston Field, the former leader of the Dominion Party. The Rhodesian 
Front was a far-right political party built on settler colonial ideology of European superiority. It 
brought together the divided right-wing parties of South Rhodesia with an adamant stance in 
favor of preserving the Land Apportionment Act which enabled racial segregation by defining 
where Blacks and Whites could live and creating African reserves. The Rhodesian Front also 
promoted the idea of “community development” a policy that encouraged the development of 
segregated communities and the preservation of “cultural differences.” Opponents of the party 
argued that “community development” was code for Rhodesian Apartheid. The Rhodesian Front 
                                                 
33 Blake, History of Rhodesia, 345. 
34 Weiss and Parpart, Sir Garfield Todd, 151. 
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insistence on a stronger political relationship with South Africa strengthened these allegations. 
The British who carefully watched Rhodesian politics for signs of possible secession from the 
Empire, did not consider the Rhodesian Front a threat to the liberal United Federal Party in the 
1962 elections. They regarded it as a party “whose leadership lacks dynamism and whose 
policies are directed towards ensuring the firmly entrenched position of the European.”35 British 
observers believed that the overwhelming number of moderate voters would render whatever 
support The Rhodesian Front had null. This would, however, unfortunately not be correct. The 
Rhodesian Front won the 1962 Parliamentary elections by a landslide and in doing so would 
control Rhodesian politics—and the course of history for the next eighteen years. 
Winston Field became the first Rhodesian Front Prime Minister in 1962, but many people 
within his party quickly realized that he did not have the temperament for such a contentious 
political office. When combined with his softer stance on racial issues and most especially his 
refusal to back a measure of independence from Britain, his positions led many members of the 
Rhodesian Front to feel they deserved someone whose political views were more closely aligned 
with their own.36 Thus, in 1964 after only two years in office, Ian Smith replaced Winston Field 
as Prime Minister and would go on to declare Rhodesia independent and sovereign in the face of 
growing pressure from Britain to grant majority rule. In 1965, Ian Smith declared a Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain and became the most notable face of the 
Rhodesian Front and the poster child for resistance against majority rule in Africa. 
Unlike their liberal predecessors, White Rhodesians saw Field and Smith as being 
imbued with the “Rhodesian Spirit”. Characters built on solid moral foundations with the tenants 
of loyalty, community support, and a solid familial foundation because “great nations are built on 
                                                 
35 The National Archives (TNA): DO 183/29 Rhodesian Front Party 
36 Blake, History of Rhodesia, 360. 
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the foundation of great families”.37 The Rhodesian Front promoted themselves as standing for 
traditional family values and encompassing the hard-working spirit of the Rhodesian settler who 
made “something out of nothing” in their new homeland. When voters went to the polls, they 
chose candidates who they believed embodied these virtues. Winston Field had been a railroad 
man before he entered politics and Ian Smith was the embodiment of what it meant to be a red-
blooded Rhodesian. An avid sportsman and rancher, Smith had spent the second world war first 
at Rhodes University active in rugby and rowing and then as a pilot in the Royal Air Force.38 In 
his memoir, Smith makes reference numerous times to the loyalty of Rhodesians and how they 
are “more British than the British”39. The settlers who left Britain to start a new life in Southern 
Africa were more hard-working and patriotic, he claimed, than the citizens of Britain. Many 
Rhodesians shared these beliefs which would be a recurrent theme in negotiations with the 
British in the early-1960s. Rhodesians saw themselves as the “torch…of Western Christian 
Civilization…[across] the dark continent”40 and the British as a force attempting to extinguish 
the flame by acting against Rhodesia’s best interests. As Russian forces attempted to gain 
influence in Africa and the number of African countries gaining independence and establishing 
majority rule grew, Smith and other Rhodesians like him, claimed the flame was growing 
smaller. For those backing the Rhodesian Front, to allow and encourage majority rule was the 
same as initiating a coup and undermining the government. They saw Rhodesia as “God’s own 
country,”41 and the last ember of Western Christian Civilization in Africa.42  
                                                 
37 Smith, The Great Betrayal, 27. 
38 Ibid., 10. 
39 Ibid., 3, 9. 
40 Ibid., 3. 
41 Ibid., 24. 
42 Peter Godwin, Peter and Ian Hancock. ‘Rhodesians Never Die’: The Impact of War and Political Change on 
White Rhodesia, c.1970–1980 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 9. 
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Rhodesians believed their greatest opponent was Communism. The Rhodesian Front 
classified many groups and people who disagreed their stances as communists, but the most 
notable and vilified group of people were the African Nationalists fighting for majority rule. 
Believed it to be acting intentionally to undermine the government, in 1962 the Rhodesian Front 
outlawed the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), the dominant political party opposing 
the Rhodesian Front at the time.43 The White Rhodesian considered the African Nationalists 
“communist terrorists” and believed that their only goal was to bring chaos and destruction to 
Rhodesia. Often referencing the events that followed independence in the Belgian Congo and 
other newly sovereign nations as examples of the horrors of transferring power into the hands of 
African nationalists, the Rhodesian Front believed that it was in the best interest of Africans to 
be ruled by whites as the system of democracy was foreign to them.44 Believed to be “still fairly 
primitive,” Africans were regarded by the Rhodesian Front as children who did not know what 
was good for them, and whose disagreement with policies was due to ignorance of governmental 
matters.45 While he did not believe in their mission or their ability to lead Rhodesia, in his 
memoir Smith attempted to make himself seem empathetic to the motives of the Black 
Rhodesians. “No matter how misguided, [African politicians] were at least trying to gain for 
themselves benefits that they had failed to achieve through their own efforts.”46 African 
Nationalists, therefore, was regarded by the Rhodesian Front as rabble-rousers who sought to 
breed conflict in an otherwise peaceful country. 
In the year following the dissolution of Federation, Britain granted both Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland their independence to become Zambia and Malawi, respectively. 
                                                 
43 The National Archives (TNA): DO 183/29 The Rhodesian Front Party 
44 Smith, The Great Betrayal, 108. 
45 The National Archives (TNA): FCO 36/359 Speeches of Ian Smith 
46 Smith, The Great Betrayal, 144. 
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Southern Rhodesia was not granted their independence due to British concerns about the lack of 
African enfranchisement. The political right in Southern Rhodesia saw it as an intentional act of 
disrespect which angered them as they believed their country was more deserving of 
independence than the other nations in Federation. This most especially upset the newly elected 
Prime Minister Ian Smith, who believed that the “British solutions for Africa went wrong”.47 
Instead of Britain’s solution of independence which immediate instituted a system of “one man 
one vote”, the Rhodesian Front believed that a system of gradualism was necessary “to ensure 
that people fully understood the complicated democratic system”.48 This was at odds with the 
British directive of “No Independence before Majority Rule” which was the backbone of their 
argument against South Rhodesian sovereignty in the early 1960s. Nevertheless, the Rhodesian 
Front negotiated, unsuccessfully, for several years with Britain for independence and 
sovereignty. This continued disagreement over what was considered a “sufficiently 
representative institution” for voting continued up until Southern Rhodesia declared itself 
independent in November of 1965.49 Rhodesian politicians resisted the British requirement of 
“One Man, One Vote” and argued that in setting majority rule as a condition for independence 
the British were forcefully imposing it on them.50 Smith and many others in the Rhodesian Front 
perceived themselves as members of their own Shangani Patrol surrounded by hostile forces who 
plotted their downfall. 
 In an attempt to appease the British need for representative voting, the Rhodesian Front 
set up an Indaba, or meeting of elder Chiefs, District Headmen and Kraalheads, leaders of small 
                                                 
47 Smith, The Great Betrayal, 108. 
48 Ibid. 
49 The National Archives (TNA): DO 183/294 Visit to London by Ian Smith, Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia: 
Records of Meetings. 
50 Smith, The Great Betrayal, 88. 
16 
 
rural communities, to discuss the issue of the 1961 Constitution..51 Six-hundred and twenty-two 
people gathered in Salisbury on October 22, 1964 to participate in the Indaba. The Rhodesian 
Front recorded the results of the nearly week long meeting as overwhelming support for the 1961 
Constitution.52 It is important to note, however, that there is no voting or taking sides in a 
traditional Indaba. It is a discussion between leaders and a general consensus is taken at the end, 
but was not considered a “system” of establishing opinion. What most worried the British was 
the overly simple choice given to the chiefs to decide between an African Nationalist 
Government or a government on the basis of the 1961 Constitution. They believed this to be 
unfair as the tribal heads had “no love for the nationalists” and skewed the outcome.53 The 1961 
Constitution, written by a majority Rhodesian Front Parliament, was opposed by many Africans 
as well as the British who argued that the Five Principles necessary for Rhodesian independence 
were not fulfilled by the Constitution. These Five Principles were: 
1) Unimpeded progress towards majority rule 
2) Guarantee against retrogressive amendments to the constitution 
3) Immediate improvements to the political status of the African population 
4) Progress towards the end of racial discrimination 
5) The basis of independence needs to be acceptable for all people of Rhodesia54  
Voters in Rhodesia were divided into two categories, or rolls in which votes were weighted 
differently. The A-roll controlled eighty percent of the total weight while the B-roll controlled 
only twenty percent. Most White voters were on the A-roll because they were able to meet the 
high income, property, and educational requirements. B-roll voters had lower requirements to 
                                                 
51 The National Archives (TNA): DO 183/504 Ian Smith’s Proposals for Consulting Rhodesian Africans. 
52 Smith, The Great Betrayal, 81–82. 
53 The National Archives (TNA): DO 183/504 Ian Smith’s Proposals for Consulting Rhodesian Africans. 
54 The National Archives (TNA): FCO 36/1434 The Vatican’s Attitude towards Rhodesia 
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meet and this roll was overwhelmingly populated by Blacks. While theoretically, the 1961 
Constitution would eventually allow more Africans would be on the A-roll, this was only if the 
government kept the voting requirements the same. The risk was that independence would be 
given immediately to the white minority government who might overturn the British 
requirements once independence was granted and enact stricter laws that prohibited blacks from 
voting at all. Because the constitution violated nearly all of the five principles the British set 
forth, it was not well supported by others outside of the Rhodesian Front.55  
 When another round of negotiation failed in October of 1965, the Rhodesian Front saw 
the position of the Liberal Labour party Prime Minister, Harold Wilson as immovable towards 
their cause. The Rhodesian Front decided if the British would not grant them independence, they 
would declare it themselves.56 This measure was adopted by the Rhodesian Parliament on 
November 11, 1965 and termed the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). Ian Smith 
announced the proclamation in a radio broadcast to the entire nation which outlined his party’s 
grievances and rationale. 
Whereas in the course of human affairs history has shown that it may become necessary 
for a people to resolve the political affiliations which have connected them with another 
people and to assume among other nations the separate and equal status to which they are 
entitled: And whereas in such event a respect for the opinions of mankind requires them 
to declare to other nations the causes which impel them to assume full responsibility for 
their affairs 
Now Therefore, We, The Government of Rhodesia, Do Hereby Declare: 
That it is an indisputable and accepted historic fact that since 1923 the Government of 
Rhodesia have exercised the powers of self-government and have been responsible for 
the progress, development and welfare of their people; 
That the people of Rhodesia having demonstrated their loyalty to the Crown and to their 
kith and kin in the United Kingdom and elsewhere through two world wars, and having 
been prepared to shed their blood and give of their substance in what they believed to be 
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56 Smith, The Great Betrayal, 104. 
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the mutual interests of freedom-loving people, now see all that they have cherished about 
to be shattered on the rocks of expediency; 
That the people of Rhodesia have witnessed a process which is destructive of those very 
precepts upon which civilization in a primitive country has been built, they have seen the 
principles of Western democracy, responsible government and moral standards crumble 
elsewhere, nevertheless they have remained steadfast; 
That the people of Rhodesia fully support the requests of their government for sovereign 
independence but have witnessed the consistent refusal of the Government of the United 
Kingdom to accede to their entreaties; 
That the Government of the United Kingdom have thus demonstrated that they are not 
prepared to grant sovereign independence to Rhodesia on terms acceptable to the people 
of Rhodesia, thereby persisting in maintaining an unwarrantable jurisdiction over 
Rhodesia, obstructing laws and treaties with other states and the conduct of affairs with 
other nations and refusing assent to laws necessary for the public good, all this to the 
detriment of the future peace, prosperity and good government of Rhodesia; 
That the Government of Rhodesia have for a long period patiently and in good faith 
negotiated with the Government of the United Kingdom for the removal of the remaining 
limitations placed upon them and for the grant of sovereign independence; 
That in the belief that procrastination and delay strike at and injure the very life of the 
nation, the Government of Rhodesia consider it essential that Rhodesia should attain, 
without delay, sovereign independence, the justice of which is beyond question; 
Now Therefore, We The Government of Rhodesia, in humble submission to Almighty 
God who controls the destinies of nations, conscious that the people of Rhodesia have 
always shown unswerving loyalty and devotion to Her Majesty the Queen and earnestly 
praying that we and the people of Rhodesia will not be hindered in our determination to 
continue exercising our undoubted right to demonstrate the same loyalty and devotion, 
and seeking to promote the common good so that the dignity and freedom of all men may 
be assured, Do, By This Proclamation, adopt, enact and give to the people of Rhodesia 
the Constitution annexed hereto;  
God Save The Queen57 
The British immediately reacted with disbelief and swift action. Harold Wilson referred to 
Rhodesia as a “rebel regime” and the British referred to the action as “IDI” for Illegal 
Declaration of Independence. The British had prepared for the possibility of a Rhodesian 
declaration of independence and in a 1964 memo instructed Humphrey Gibbs, the governor of 
Rhodesia, to ignore the new government and condemn their actions. “[C]onsider treating the 
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Southern Rhodesian Government, after a declaration of independence, and supposing that Mr. 
Smith and his Ministers have been dismissed but had remained in charge, as non-existent, 
‘dead’.”58 This is exactly what happened. Gibbs informed Smith and his cabinet that their actions 
were considered treason to which they responded that he no longer held any power. On the 12th 
of November the United Nations issued Resolution 216 which condemned UDI and called upon 
all states to recognize Rhodesia as a “illegal racist minority regime”.59 They reaffirmed this 
resolution on the 20th of November with Resolution 217 which condemned the “usurpation of 
power by a racist settler minority” and called for the swift end to the regime whose “continuance 
in time constitutes a threat to international peace and security”.60 The Smith regime would not be 
overturned so quickly. The Rhodesian Front would continue to hold power in Rhodesia for 
another fifteen years and catapult the country into a civil war that would claim the lives of 
thousands. While many white Rhodesians sided with the Rhodesian Front, there was a small 
minority—consisting of around five percent of the voting population—that did not.61 Although 
the political conflict in this period worsened the division between Whites and Africans, there 
were a small handful of whites who defied this dichotomy to fight for equal treatment and civil 
rights for their African neighbors and countrymen. 
 
Judith Todd 
 After coming into power, the Rhodesian Front began a concerted effort to control the 
news and media reporting about them. The Rhodesian Front also partnered with a Film 
Company, Dragon Films, which was hired to create “highly professional propaganda 
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documentaries”. They also established an Intelligence Bureau which was tasked to investigate 
the extent of communist infiltration as well as recommending the best course of action regarding 
counter-propaganda.  The Rhodesian Front also established their own journal, Newsfront.62 
Beyond production of their own media, the Rhodesian Front also sought to control what was said 
of them externally. This was achieved through extreme censorship. Among the leaders of 
opposition parties arrested were Joshua Nkomo, Robert Mugabe and other African Nationalists 
whom Ian Smith and the Rhodesian Front considered terrorists. 63 Among these was Ndabaningi 
Sithole whose publications were banned by 1970. The Rhodesian Front also banned academic 
publications critical of the party, as well as publications with sexual or drug connotations which 
were believed to be signs of “Communist conspiracy.”64 Journalists and speakers who criticized 
the government were almost guaranteed to face censorship. Judith Todd was one such person 
greatly affected by government censorship. 
 Judith Todd was born on the Dadaya Mission in Southern Rhodesia in 1943. Her parents, 
Grace and the aforementioned Garfield Todd, had immigrated to Southern Rhodesia from New 
Zealand as missionaries in 1934.65 Judith spent her earliest years surrounded by African people; 
her earliest friends were all black. This unique upbringing outside of the “little white island” 
most White Rhodesians lived in afforded her the unique experience of seeing and knowing 
Africans outside of their role as servants and farmhands.66 This upbringing gave Judith a very 
different perspective than that of other whites in Rhodesia at the time. Because of their proximity 
to Africans and role in African education, missionaries were often regarded by many white 
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Rhodesian as “kaffir-lovers.”67 It was not until she began attending an all-white school that she 
realized the extent of racism and discrimination that was so pervasive in Rhodesia.68 Influenced 
by the experiences of her childhood and the liberal views of her parents, Judith Todd became an 
outspoken opponent of the Rhodesian Front at a very young age. In 1964, she was arrested and 
found guilty of contravening the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act by organizing a 
demonstration against the banning of a newspaper, The Daily News.69 Shortly after the 
declaration of UDI, she attempted to publish a scathing denunciation of the regime in a book 
entitled An Act of Treason: Rhodesia 1965. Although finished in early 1966, it was quickly 
banned from Rhodesia until 1982.70 She remained an active voice of opposition to the Rhodesian 
Front through Ian Smith’s tenure as president. 
 Judith’s earliest memories of her childhood were feelings of empathy for the Africans 
who were treated as less than human.71 While their school years imbued many of Judith’s peers 
with patriotism and national pride, it filled her instead with a sense of skepticism towards the 
stories of beloved national heroes.  
White Rhodesian children are all acquainted with the history of the brave white pioneers 
who at great personal cost brought the wonders of Christian civilization to a dark, 
barbaric land…undoubtedly many of the pioneers were fine men, who performed gallant, 
selfless, courageous deeds and they deserve our honour and respect. But towering over 
them stands the figure of Cecil John Rhodes, urged on by a vision of the Union Jack 
fluttering over the entire African continent, ruthlessly crushing any individual or people 
who threatened the realization of his dreams, and leaving a legacy of questionable desires 
and dark deeds to brood over this land.72 
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Judith attended her first political meeting with her father when she was nine years old.73 As she 
grew older, Judith became increasingly involved in politics and eventually joined the African 
National Congress (ANC), one of the first white members to do so. The ANC was the first fully 
fledged African Nationalist political party in Rhodesia dedicated to African welfare. The 
Rhodesian government saw them as a threat and they were labeled a “subversive movement” by 
Edgar Whitehead in 1959, as part of the Unlawful Organization Act.74 Her political participation 
distanced Judith from many in the white Rhodesian community who already saw her and her 
family as the antithesis of what it meant to be a Rhodesian. She felt ostracized because white 
Rhodesians were not reluctant to voice their opinions. Whilst on house arrest in November 1965, 
Garfield Todd received a letter regarding his daughter Judith. “We are not aware of the precise 
upbringing of your daughter and nor are we interested; but it is obvious that she is certainly not a 
Rhodesian, and therefore this woman should be warned to keep out of affairs appertaining to 
Rhodesia to whom–like you–she is in fact nothing less than a traitor.”75 Judith herself addressed 
these rumors in a speech at Cambridge University while in exile in 1973:“There is a Rhodesian 
Front myth that my family are doing all we can to sabotage our own white tribe. On the contrary, 
my family’s effort has been directed for years towards the creation of a country where tribe and 
race are unimportant. I think I can say we will go on trying.”76 
 Judith saw that the Rhodesian Front was becoming more oppressive and authoritarian as 
it continued to evade sanctions and pass more restrictive laws to secure its power. Yet she did not 
blame all Whites for the actions of the Rhodesian Front, but instead viewed them as having been 
led astray by propaganda and the irrational fear of people who are not White. “Many whites are 
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innocent of the deeds that are attributed in general terms to the white government, the security 
forces, and individual settlers,” she declared. “Their guilt is that they lent their support to a 
regime which over the years has repressed the legitimate aspirations of the people as a whole.”77 
Judith instead placed at least part of the blame on the British for the lack of colonial oversight 
and for allowing the Rhodesians to be the “judges of [their] own cause” and “creat[ing] their own 
justifications” for the mistreatment of Africans, disregarding their wants and “blindly pursued 
the bitter destiny [the Rhodesians] had chosen.”78 She also correctly assumed that time would 
show the moral reprehensibility of the Rhodesian Front regime as the racist movement of the 
minority who were unwilling to give up their power.79 
 Judith never stopped trying to make Rhodesia a better place for everyone in the country. 
Her political actions attracted the attention of the Rhodesian security forces and in January 1972 
she was arrested with her father under the pretense that they were “likely to commit or to incite 
the commission of acts in Rhodesia which would endanger the public safety or disturb or 
interfere with the maintenance of public order.”80 Judith underwent a hunger-strike to protest her 
imprisonment and was released five weeks later after much international criticism of her 
detention. Garfield was not so lucky and would remain in house arrest on his ranch until 1976. 
After her release from jail, Judith went into a political exile abroad. Her name was banned from 
publication and her writings were outlawed. In the event she returned to Rhodesia, she was 
informed, the police would escort her straight back to jail.81 Although she was out of Rhodesia, 
she was not completely removed from the political scene. Judith took up residence in London 
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where she acted as the London Representative for the ANC and lobbied for the British to become 
more involved in removing the Rhodesian Front from power and establishing equal voting in 
Rhodesia. Additionally, she met with the Prime Minister of New Zealand and asked for his help 
in releasing her father, Garfield, from house arrest. Judith would eventually become the Special 
Representative of the African National Congress to the United Nations.82 Judith was not able to 
safely return to Rhodesia until February 1980, shortly before the first free elections were held 
and Rhodesia became Zimbabwe in April 1980.83  
 
Bishop Donal Lamont 
 In 1976, Irish missionary Bishop Donal Lamont was found guilty of aiding insurgency 
for “failing to report nationalist guerillas”. The maximum sentence for this offense was death. At 
the time of Bishop Lamont’s sentencing, the death penalty was deemed unlikely and ultimately 
the courts only sentenced Bishop Lamont to ten years.84 Nevertheless, the severity of the 
maximum punishment shows how significant the Rhodesian Front deemed subversion to their 
regime.85 Bishop Lamont was not merely a Catholic missionary who sought to help all those who 
walked through his mission’s doors. He was one of the most vocal and internationally prominent 
figures in opposition to the minority government of Rhodesia. 
 Just as the extreme, overly racist policies of the Rhodesian government came into 
existence over many decades and through a number of forces, likewise the politicization of 
Bishop Lamont’s sermons and views evolved with the political climate. He came to the Umtali 
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mission in 194686, but it was not until 1959 that his first letter of Pastoral Instruction was 
circulated denouncing racism and segregation within Rhodesia.87 This was not only the first 
letter written by Bishop Lamont dealing with Rhodesia’s problem with race, but the first Pastoral 
Letter to ever be written on this topic in Rhodesia.88 After UDI, as the Rhodesian Front-led 
government became increasingly conservative and racist, Bishop Lamont felt morally compelled 
to renounce the “political absurdity”89 of the government’s actions and rebuff their claims of 
Christian authority.90 
 In “Purchased People,” his seminal Pastoral Letter, Bishop Lamont described racial 
discrimination not as the “fundamental problem” concerning Rhodesia, but as a consequence of 
men straying from the instructions laid out for them in the Bible--the true problem with 
Rhodesian society. Bishop Lamont further asserts: 
Our Divine Lord’s doctrine of justice and charity can alone provide the basis 
for mutual understanding and ultimate peace. That doctrine has in other ages 
proved successful in reconciling the varied social conditions of men, has 
civilized barbarous races, has made clear how master and servant can live in 
the peace of the one great Christian family. That doctrine has lost nothing in 
its original power for good, and if put into daily practice, can accomplish as 
much today as it did in ages past.91 
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Bishop Lamont believed that black and white Rhodesians could come to a compromise as long 
as they were both committed to putting the laws of God, which call for charity and equal rights 
for all people, above the laws of man.92  
Whereas many political analysts believed that Bishop Lamont’s strong opinions were due 
to his Northern Irish heritage and his dislike of British politics,93 Bishop Lamont would disagree 
with the assertion that his speeches were overtly political. He was quoted as saying: “I have little 
feeling for these matters. I am not a politician. I have tried to make that clear. But I am 
concerned with social justice, and where there is no observance of social justice, you prepare the 
way for Communism.”94 It was his intention not to involve himself in secular affairs but to 
bridge the gap between the teachings of the Church and current events in an effort to benefit his 
congregation.95 He taught directly from the Bible and mainstream Catholic-orthodox thought.96 
This belief can be seen in Lamont’s initial refusal to leave Rhodesia before his superiors in the 
Church instructed him to do so. “[A]s a Bishop, I have a duty to remain in charge of my diocese 
until the supreme authority of the Roman Catholic Church informs me that I may leave. When I 
do leave, there will be no doubt about who made the decision. I must obey God rather than 
men.”97 
 As a Bishop, Lamont believed it was his duty to preach the message of the Gospel with 
the authority bestowed upon him as a successor of St. Peter.98 It was within this authority that he 
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preached racial equality within the bounds of natural law which he saw as “[God’s] Eternal Law 
and its manifestation in human nature”.99 Bishop Lamont believed that all laws that were not first 
built on the foundation of Natural Law were not morally sound. This belief pervaded his life and 
was the main factor in his willingness to disregard the laws he deemed incongruent with his 
Christian faith. “Not all the legislation in the world can make right what is morally wrong. The 
racist laws of Rhodesia are such that I cannot in conscience either condone or obey them.”100 It 
was Bishop Lamont’s philosophy that state authority is valid only if reinforced by natural law 
that led to his arrest. “[I]n these trying times it is exceedingly important that the state examine 
carefully its function, and thence recognize its limitations. It has no real claim to absolute 
autonomy, nor can it in justice sponsor or serve the interests of one particular race or group of 
people to the detriment of another.”101 He also believed in the ability of the ruled to usurp unjust, 
unrestricted power—with a caveat:  
[E]ven in the case of unjust conquest by a usurping Power, if the new rulers do in fact 
fulfill the functions of government and administration; and if through custom and lapse of 
time and the tacit consent of the governed, their so-called authority remains 
unquestioned, the principle of prescription may be applied and although the new rulers 
have objectively no true claim to the allegiance of the people, rebellion even against that 
imperfect authority is still unjustifiable, unless the conditions for it as already described, 
are simultaneously fulfilled.102 
 
These statements and many others like it angered the Rhodesian Government who put Bishop 
Lamont on their radar. This malice precipitated his arrest and may have led to the extreme length 
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of his sentence. Though the courts originally sentenced him to ten years for aiding black 
insurgents and refusing to contact authorities when they came to his mission seeking help, 
Bishop Lamont’s sentence was reduced to four years during an appeal—three of which were 
immediately suspended. Shortly thereafter, the Rhodesian government stripped Bishop Lamont 
of his citizenship and deported him back to Ireland.103 
 
Conclusion  
 The declaration of UDI in 1965 signaled the end of peaceful negotiations for the 
implementation of majority rule. The next fifteen years were a struggle between the African 
Nationalists and the far-right wing political party, the Rhodesian Front, to establish political 
dominance. This struggle culminated in the 1980 election of Robert Mugabe, who remained in 
power until November 2017. While this conflict has largely been seen as having been between 
races, there were some exceptions to this rule. Yet, it is interesting to note that both of the White 
Rhodesians discussed in this paper were from outside of mainstream Rhodesian society; both 
were from missionary backgrounds and interacted with Africans in ways that most White 
Rhodesians did not. 
The Rhodesian Front years represent not only a breakdown of the British colonial system, 
but also the domination of a racist government and racist ideals which were detrimental to free-
will and the establishment of an equal human rights. The history of Ian Smith and the Rhodesian 
Front is not the history of some obscure tidbit in a dusty history book. Just as the Rhodesian 
Front co-opted the story of the Shangani Patrol in order to fit their narrative of African savagery 
and barbarism, so have far-right wing White supremacists taken the narrative of Rhodesia’s 
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collapse as a symbol of the oppression of Christian morals in a morally bankrupt, liberal world. 
The impact of the Rhodesian Front did not end with the resignation of Ian Smith in 1979. The 
after-shocks of both the colonial imposition of Europeans and White rule during the 1960’s and 
1970’s can be felt in Zimbabwe—and around the world, to this day. 
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